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Constitutional Constraints on 
Electoral Reform in Canada:Why 
Parliament is (Mostly) Free to 
Implement a New Voting System 
Emmett Macfarlane 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Having promised that the 2015 national election would be the last 
conducted under the first-past-the-post (“FPTP”) electoral system, the 
federal government has initiated efforts to find a replacement.1 A national 
debate about the various alternatives to FPTP will undoubtedly continue, 
but a fundamental issue concerns whether Parliament faces any constraints 
on its authority to implement electoral reform. Two distinct concerns 
present themselves. First, does a change to the electoral system require a 
constitutional amendment, and if so, would such an amendment require 
provincial consent under the general amending procedure in Part V of the 
Constitution Act, 1982?2 Second, would certain electoral systems violate 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?3  
                                                                                                                       
  Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo. emacfarl@uwaterloo.ca. 
My thanks to Yasmin Dawood, B. Thomas Hall, Peter Hogg, Benjamin Oliphant, Michael Pal, Léonid 
Sirota, and the journal’s anonymous reviewers for helpful discussions and comments relating to this 
article. 
1  The Liberal Party of Canada made electoral reform a key plank in its 2015 election 
campaign platform. The precise wording was as follows: 
We are committed to ensuring that 2015 will be the last federal election conducted under 
the first-past-the-post voting system. 
We will convene an all-party Parliamentary committee to review a wide variety of reforms, 
such as ranked ballots, proportional representation, mandatory voting, and online voting. 
This committee will deliver its recommendations to Parliament. Within 18 months of 
forming government, we will introduce legislation to enact electoral reform. 
Liberal Party of Canada, A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class (2015), at 27. 
2  Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Constitution  
Act, 1982”]. 
3  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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These questions are important not only for the prospects of federal 
electoral reform, but also for their implications for the nature of 
constitutional change in Canada. On the one hand, if Parliament does not 
have the ability to alter the electoral system without provincial consent, it 
would only further cement the degree to which the country suffers from a 
constitutional paralysis, wherein both legal and political factors stifle the 
prospects for any major constitutional reform.4 On the other hand, in its 
reference opinion on Senate reform, the Supreme Court has recently 
elaborated on the importance of changes to Canada’s “constitutional 
architecture” and the federal principle embedded in the general amending 
procedure that major changes affecting provincial interests ought to 
require provincial consent.5 Similarly, democratic rights under the 
Charter may be implicated by certain changes, not only in the event 
particular electoral systems might affect the right to vote but also in 
relation to the right “to be qualified” for membership in the House of 
Commons or a provincial legislature under section 3. Existing 
jurisprudence indicates that important rights  including the right to 
effective representation and the right to meaningful participation in the 
electoral process  are embedded within section 3. How might these 
rights be implicated by electoral reform? 
This article proposes to examine and answer these questions. I argue 
in Part II of this article that while electoral reform might be regarded as a 
change of a constitutional nature, Parliament is well within its authority 
under section 44 of the amending formula to effect changes excepting 
ones that directly implicate provincial interests  specifically, the 
principle of proportional provincial representation in the House and the 
guarantees of the minimum number of seats to which each province is 
entitled. A key factor in considering electoral reform’s implications for 
the constitutional architecture, I argue, is the distinct role of the House as 
an institution representing the national will in contrast to the regionally-
composed Senate. Any analysis of provincial interests in the functioning 
of the House must consider the limits of those interests given the distinct 
nature of representation within a bicameral legislature. 
                                                                                                                       
4  For more on this, see: Emmett Macfarlane, ed., Constitutional Amendment in Canada 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016); Richard Albert, “The Difficulty of Constitutional 
Amendment in Canada” (2015) 53(1) Alberta L. Rev. 85; Richard Albert, “Constructive Unamendability 
in Canada and the United States” (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 181. 
5  Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704, 2014 SCC 32 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reference re Senate Reform”]. 
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Part III examines the implications of electoral reform for democratic 
rights under the Charter. While certain changes might implicate democratic 
rights under the Charter, I argue that none of the electoral systems likely to 
be considered would violate rights in an unreasonable manner. The most 
relevant section 3 jurisprudence explicitly acknowledges the multiple 
values and purposes that Parliament might consider in designing laws of 
democracy, including in relation to the electoral system itself. While 
extreme reform options might run up against democratic rights guarantees, 
Parliament should expect considerable latitude to implement electoral 
reform. I then briefly discuss the implications of this analysis in Part IV. 
II. ELECTORAL REFORM AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
1. Does Electoral Reform Count as Constitutional Change? 
The constitutional amending formula is contained in Part V of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, and it sets out no fewer than five procedures for 
changes to the Constitution.6 Amendments under the general procedure 
of section 38 require resolutions of the House of Commons and the 
Senate and at least seven provinces representing at least 50 per cent  
of the population. In addition to this default procedure, the formula 
includes: the unanimity procedure (section 41), which lists a set of 
matters requiring the support of all 10 provinces; the bilateral procedure 
(section 43), where changes affecting certain provinces but not others 
may be made by resolutions of the House and Senate and the legislative 
assembly of each province to which the amendment applies; section 44, 
which allows Parliament to exclusively make laws in relation to the 
federal executive or the Senate and House of Commons; and section 45, 
which allows provinces to amend their own provincial constitutions. 
Electoral reform is not specifically mentioned in Part V, although a 
couple of its provisions relate to the electoral system. Section 41(b) 
mandates unanimity for any changes affecting the right of a province to a 
number of members in the House not less than the number of Senators by  
 
                                                                                                                       
6  In addition to the five listed above, there are provisions allowing provinces to dissent 
from amendments on certain issues and to receive compensation in certain cases (section 40). 
Further, the Senate enjoys a suspensive veto for amendments made under s. 38, 41, 42 or 43, which 
the House can override by adopting the resolution a second time 180 days after adopting the initial 
resolution (s. 47). 
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which the province is entitled to be represented at the time Part V came 
into force. Section 42, which lists specific matters that may only be made 
in accordance with the general procedure, includes section 42(a), specifying 
changes relating to the principle of proportionate representation of the 
provinces in the House. As will be discussed in this section, until recent 
jurisprudence that narrowed the apparent scope of section 44, it was 
widely assumed that electoral reform would generally fall under section 44. 
The structure and rules relating to, or governing, Canada’s electoral 
system are found in a mix of constitutional and statutory provisions. 
Relevant constitutional provisions include sections 37, 51 and 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867,7 which set out the number of electoral districts 
(ridings) in each province or territory, detail the rules for readjusting the 
representation of seats in the House, and permit Parliament to increase 
the number of seats in the House, respectively. Voting rights and the right 
to be qualified for membership in Parliament and provincial legislatures 
are entrenched in section 3 of the Charter. Many of the more specific and 
comprehensive rules pertaining to the electoral system are established via 
ordinary statute. Detailed rules relating to the process and administration 
of elections are set out in the Canada Elections Act,8 electoral districts 
are established by proclamations issued under the Electoral Boundaries 
Readjustment Act9 and qualifications and disqualifications of members of 
the House of Commons are set out in the Parliament of Canada Act.10 
Given this legal context, it might be thought that certain types of 
electoral reform  particularly those that do not alter provincial seat 
distribution in the House  are possible without recourse to 
constitutional amendment at all. A move from FPTP to preferential 
balloting (where voters rank candidates in their order of preference, also 
known as alternative vote or instant run-off), for example, would not 
necessitate any change to existing ridings, only to the rules about how 
votes are tabulated. It is not clear why recourse to formal constitutional 
amendment would be necessary to effect such a change, nor have many 
commentators expressed an opinion to the contrary, at least until recently. 
The Supreme Court’s two 2014 reference opinions pertaining to 
constitutional amendment complicate this issue. In Reference re Supreme 
                                                                                                                       
7  30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
8  S.C. 2000, c. 9. 
9  R.S.C. 1985, c. E-3. 
10  R.S.C. 1985, c. P-1. 
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Court Act, ss. 5 and 6,11 a 6-1 majority of the Court determined that the 
eligibility requirements for Supreme Court justices as set out in the 
Supreme Court Act12 were part of the “composition of the Supreme 
Court”, changes to which are listed in section 41(d) as a matter requiring 
unanimity. In effect, the Court constitutionalized parts of an ordinary 
statute. Controversially, the Court’s opinion outlined a history in which 
the Court’s existence and functioning engaged the interests of both 
Parliament and the provinces before the institution was even entrenched 
via Part V in 1982.13 Prior to 2014, the extant academic debate regarding 
the Court’s constitutional status does not even entertain this notion, as it 
largely concerned whether the Court was even entrenched after being 
mentioned in the amending formula, given that Parliament created the 
Court via ordinary statute under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
Some scholars believed references to the Court in Part V were limited by 
the fact that the “Constitution of Canada” as defined in section 52(2) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 did not include the Supreme Court Act. Peter 
Hogg noted that the “amending procedures are not required for the 
amendment of statutes or instruments that are not part of the Constitution 
of Canada; anything that is not part of the Constitution of Canada can be 
amended by the ordinary action of the competent legislative body”.14 
Other scholars disagreed.15  
It is unclear what other parts of the Supreme Court Act remain normal 
statutory law or are now, in fact, part of the Constitution. Moreover, it is 
not clear whether other statutes, such as the Canada Elections Act, might 
be deemed constitutionally entrenched in the future because they are 
implicated by the amending formula.  
The Court’s opinion in Reference re Senate Reform, issued one month 
later, arguably means that certain provisions in the Canada Elections Act 
                                                                                                                       
11  [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433, 2014 SCC 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reference 
re Supreme Court Act”]. 
12  R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26. 
13  Reference re Supreme Court Act, supra, note 11. The majority suggested this occurred 
with the abolition of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1949, at para. 85, and 
was further cemented by the end of appeals as of right to the Court in civil cases, at para. 86, writing 
“Increasingly, those concerned with constitutional reform accepted that future reforms would have to 
recognize the Supreme Court’s position within the architecture of the Constitution”, at para. 87. 
This, according to the Court, was “confirmed” by the Constitution Act, 1982, at para. 76. 
14  Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Thomson Canada Limited, 
2003), at 73. 
15  Patrick J. Monahan & Byron Shaw, Constitutional Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2013), at 191; Stephen A. Scott, “Pussycat, Pussycat or Patriation and the New Constitutional 
Amendment Process” (1982) 20(2) U.W.O. L. Rev. 247, at 272-73. 
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are entrenched, or at least that the electoral system is fundamental to the 
House of Commons as an institution and should therefore be regarded as 
having a constitutional nature. In the Senate reference, the Court 
elaborated on the Constitution’s “architecture”, a concept it had invoked 
in previous cases,16 and which it described as “the principle that ‘[t]he 
individual elements of the Constitution are linked to the others, and  
must be interpreted by reference to the structure of the Constitution as  
a whole’”.17 Constitutional amendments, the Court explained, “are not 
confined to textual changes. They include changes to the Constitution’s 
architecture.”18 The Court found that the government’s proposed 
consultative elections for senators and senatorial term limits both require 
provincial consent under the general amending procedure. Rather  
than limiting their reasons on consultative elections to the fact that they 
would constitute a change to the “method of selecting Senators” under 
section 42(1)(b), therefore requiring recourse to the general amending 
procedure, the majority also found that implementing consultative 
elections would alter the constitutional architecture by changing the 
essential functioning of the Senate and the role of senators.  
The Court applied similar reasoning to its analysis of whether 
enacting term limits for senators (notably, not mentioned in the amending 
formula) could be accomplished by Parliament alone under section 44 or 
required use of the general amending procedure. On the dividing line 
between the two procedures, the justices emphasized that section 44, “as 
an exception to the general procedure, encompasses measures that 
maintain or change the Senate without altering its fundamental nature 
and role.”19 The justices determined that existing senatorial tenure  an 
appointment until the age of 75, or “the duration of their active 
professional lives” is linked to the conception of the Senate as a 
complementary legislative body of sober second thought.20 Therefore, a 
significant change to senatorial tenure would alter the Senate’s role, and 
can only be achieved under the general amending procedure. 
                                                                                                                       
16  Ontario Public Service Employees’ Union v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J. 
No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 57 (S.C.C.); Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, 
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reference re Secession of Quebec”]. 
17  Reference re Senate Reform, supra, note 5, at para. 26 citing Reference re Secession of 
Quebec, supra, note 16, at para. 50. 
18  Id., at para. 27. 
19  Id., at para. 75. 
20  Id., at para. 79. 
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It is clear from the Court’s articulation of the constitutional architecture 
concept that electoral reform could be regarded as a change of a 
constitutional nature. The question then becomes whether Parliament has 
the authority to make major changes to the electoral system without 
provincial consent. 
2. Does Federal Electoral Reform Require Provincial Consent? 
The constitutional architecture concept generates considerable 
uncertainty regarding the dividing line between the general amending 
procedure and section 44, which allows Parliament alone to make 
institutional changes to the executive or the House of Commons and  
the Senate.21 One major problem with the Court’s approach is evident in 
the example of senatorial term limits. In Reference re Senate Reform, the 
Court explicitly refused to consider whether there might be a point at 
which differently prescribed term limits  lengthy, non-renewable 
terms, for example  would not fundamentally alter the Senate’s role. 
“It may be possible”, the Court noted, “to devise a fixed term so lengthy 
that it provides a security of tenure which is functionally equivalent to 
that provided by life tenure. However, it is difficult to objectively 
identify the precise term duration that guarantees an equivalent degree of 
security of tenure.”22 By refusing to engage in line-drawing (which was 
precisely what was being asked of it),23 the Court, even by its own 
standard, risked unreasonably narrowing the scope of section 44. 
                                                                                                                       
21  For a more detailed critique of the Court’s logic in the Senate reference, see: Emmett 
Macfarlane, “Unsteady Architecture: Ambiguity, the Senate Reference, and the Future of 
Constitutional Amendment in Canada” (2015) 60(4) McGill L.J. 883. 
22  Reference re Senate Reform, supra, note 5, at para. 81. 
23  The reference question posed by the Governor in Council clearly contemplates that 
certain term limits might be short enough to require provincial consent while others might be long 
enough that their impact on the Senate would be relatively minor such that Parliament could 
implement them unilaterally. In other words, the government was asking the Court to draw a line. 
The question was written as follows: 
1. In relation to each of the following proposed limits to the tenure of Senators, is it 
within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada, acting pursuant 
to section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982, to make amendments to section 29 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 providing for: 
(a)  a fixed term of nine years for Senators, as set out in clause 5 of Bill C-7, the Senate 
Reform Act; 
(b)  a fixed term of ten years or more for Senators; 
(c)  a fixed term of eight years or less for Senators; 
(d)  a fixed term of the life of two or three Parliaments for Senators; 
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A consequence of the constitutional architecture approach is a lack  
of clarity over when provincial consent is implicated. The approach 
effectively requires that the Court accurately describe the different 
animating features of the various institutions and processes that make up 
the constitutional architecture beyond the constitutional text. As a result 
of this lack of clarity, some commentators have argued that the 
constitutional architecture concept means that electoral reform can only 
be accomplished via the general amending procedure.24 Michael Pal 
writes that provincial interests in the federal electoral system might be 
regarded as similar to their interest in Senate reform. He describes 
provincial interests as follows: 
Moving away from FPTP would affect provincial interests. The federal 
government and the provinces have been fighting about provincial 
representation in the House since its creation. Introducing pure 
proportional representation, or a mixed-member system of the type 
used in Germany, would dramatically alter Canadian politics. Moving 
from the electoral system in place since 1867 would constitute  
a fundamental change to the House and to the Constitution. The 
implication is that Parliament likely can’t act alone.25 
Pal concludes that major electoral reform, including changes to 
proportional representation26 (“PR”) or mixed-member proportional27 
(“MMP”) systems, likely requires the general amending procedure, but 
                                                                                                                       
(e)  a renewable term for Senators, as set out in clause 2 of Bill S-4, Constitution Act, 
2006 (Senate tenure); 
(f) limits to the terms for Senators appointed after October 14, 2008 as set out in 
subclause 4(1) of Bill C-7, the Senate Reform Act; and 
(g) retrospective limits to the terms for Senators appointed before October 14, 2008? 
24  Michael Pal, “Why Canada’s top court must weigh in on electoral reform”, The Globe and 
Mail (January 15, 2016), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/why-canadas-top-court-
must-weigh-in-on-electoral-reform/article28198932/>; Yaakov M. Roth & Jonathan E. Roth, “Liberals’ 
electoral reform plan is legally futile”, The Toronto Star (January 18, 2016), online: <http://www. 
thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2016/01/18/liberals-electoral-reform-plan-is-legally-futile.html>. See 
also: Michael Pal, “Constitutional Amendment After the Senate Reference and the Prospects for Electoral 
Reform” (2016) presented at Osgoode Hall Law School Annual Constitutional Cases Conference. 
25  Id. 
26  Proportional representation includes a variety of systems that allocate seats based on the 
percentage of seats cast. They include party list systems, which includes seat allocations from party 
lists, or the single transferable vote (“STV”), which uses ranked-balloting in multi-member 
constituencies to arrive at a proportional outcome. 
27  Mixed-member proportional systems are a hybrid of district-based systems like FPTP and 
party lists, where a portion of a legislature’s seats are allocated on a list basis as a top up to ensure a 
more proportional outcome overall. Under MMP voters typically have two votes: one for a local 
riding representative and one for the party list. 
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that certain changes  such as preferential balloting  might be 
interpreted as only trivially affecting provincial interests and could 
possibly be achieved by Parliament alone. 
It is clear that any electoral reform that departs from the basic principle 
of proportionate representation for seats by province in the House would 
require provincial consent under section 42(a). Similarly, any electoral 
reform that would reduce the number of any province’s seats below their 
constitutional guarantee under section 41(b) would require unanimous 
consent of the provinces. Given the Court’s constitutional architecture 
approach, even if these provisions were not explicitly listed in Part V it is 
clear that provincial interests in their proportionate representation in the 
House would be implicated by any reform to the electoral system that 
seriously altered seat distribution.  
Indeed, one significant reason that section 44 is the appropriate 
procedure for federal electoral reform is the fact that Parliament has 
previously used that procedure to modify the formula for apportioning 
seats in the House of Commons, in 1985 with the Representation Act, 
1985,28 and again in 2011 with the Fair Representation Act.29 Since the 
apportionment of seats is directly relevant to provincial interests vis-à-vis 
the House of Commons, it is notable that these amendments were made 
by Parliament alone with little controversy. Any change, however, that 
dramatically departs from the basic principle of proportionality, is 
something that would implicate provincial interests and require their 
consent. Therefore, assessing which amending procedure is implicated 
depends not just on the matter at issue but the substance of the proposed 
amendment and whether it directly affects provincial interests.  
Pal has written that the 2011 Fair Representation Act does implicate 
provincial interests and that, in light of the Reference re Senate Reform 
reasoning, it may have been an unconstitutional amendment.30 He writes 
that it “is hard to see how altering the formula for representation in the 
House by province engages purely federal interests. The provinces are 
keenly and directly interested in the number of seats they hold, the 
proportion of the House this represents, and the impact of any relative or 
absolute change in provincial population on their seat complement.”31 
Importantly, Pal views the application of Reference re Senate Reform 
                                                                                                                       
28  S.C. 1986, c. 8. 
29  S.C. 2011, c. 26. 
30  Michael Pal, “Fair Representation in the House of Commons?” (2015) J.P.P.L. 35 [hereinafter 
“Pal, ‘Fair Representation’”]. 
31  Id., at 47. 
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logic to this context as an “unintended impact”, noting that the likely 
effect would be to freeze the formula for representation  as provincial 
consensus about a new formula would be difficult to achieve  and the 
House would grow increasingly unrepresentative.32  
Yet I would argue that this is precisely why a contextualist reading of 
the Constitution’s protections for seat proportionality are fittingly within 
Parliament’s amending authority under section 44, something Pal notes 
was upheld in the 1988 case Campbell v. Canada (Attorney General).33 
That decision affirmed that the principle of seat proportionality was 
broadly defined to allow for deviations from absolute proportionality 
given that smaller provinces enjoy guaranteed representation greater than 
their populations would otherwise allow. Under a narrow or absolutist 
understanding of the principle of proportionality, the constitutional 
guarantee of four seats for Prince Edward Island, for example, would 
simply not be possible without a massive (and arguably ludicrous) 
increase in the number of seats in the House. A broader interpretation of 
the principle is therefore consistent with the constitutional architecture 
concept itself, given that assessing the underlying structure of the 
Constitution in light of the amending formula requires a contextualist 
understanding of its written and unwritten components and how they 
interact and operate together. Provincial consent for changes to the 
formula for apportioning seats in the House should thus only be required 
when a proposed change departs significantly from historical margins or 
constitutionally-mandated norms. 
Further, provided that the principle of proportional representation for 
the provinces is not disturbed, Parliament is given unequivocal authority 
under section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to increase the number of 
seats in the House. Pal suggests section 52 might itself be regarded as the 
basis for unilateral amendment by Parliament of the authority to 
redistribute seats under section 51.34 
More significantly, it is not clear that provincial interests in federal 
electoral reform extends beyond the proportion of seats they are afforded. 
As in many bicameral federations, the very nature of representation as it 
relates to the two houses, the House and the Senate, are functionally 
different, with the lower house emphasizing representation of the national 
                                                                                                                       
32  Id., at 46. 
33  [1988] B.C.J. No. 442, 49 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (B.C.C.A.), affg [1987] B.C.J. No. 3152, 21 
B.C.L.R. (2d) 130 (B.C.S.C.). 
34  Pal, “Fair Representation”, supra, note 30, at 49. 
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will by population and the upper house representation by state, province or 
region. Indeed, in Reference re Senate Reform, the Court emphasized 
regional representation as an essential feature of the Senate, and as a key 
aspect of provincial interests in the Senate.35  
Provincial interest in electoral reform of the House, aside from seat 
proportionality and seat floor guarantees as reflected in the constitutional 
text, is much more tenuous. Pal is undoubtedly correct that major 
electoral reform could dramatically alter Canadian politics and the 
outcomes generated in the House. A move from a FPTP system to some 
variant of PR would inevitably result in more minority governments or 
the development of a culture of coalition governments, and changes to 
the party system itself. However, as Leonid Sirota writes, electoral 
reform would not affect the “nature” of the House of Commons as the 
representative part of the national legislature, or its primary role of 
holding the government to account under responsible government.36 
Moreover, it is not obvious why changes to party distribution or an 
increase in minority or coalition governments, however significant they 
would be, implicate provincial interests in the same way changes to the 
nature of Senate representation might. The role of the House is premised 
on popular representation of the national will, just as the Senate’s role is, 
in part, to ensure regional (provincial) representation at the national 
level.37 These different roles and natures of representation reflect the very 
function of bicameralism in a federation like Canada. If the Court is to 
assess the constitutional architecture in light of a contextualist analysis of 
the role and purpose of the central institutions  as it did in both 2014 
reference opinions  then it needs to pay heed to not only when 
provincial interests are at stake, but also when they are not. 
If the provinces have a constitutional interest in any other aspects of 
House of Commons representation, one might be the existence of 
electoral districts assigned on a provincial basis, which are explicitly 
contemplated by several provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
                                                                                                                       
35  Reference re Senate Reform, supra, note 5, at para. 15. 
36  Leonid Sirota, “Yes, They Can”, Double Aspect blog (January 19, 2016), online: 
<https://doubleaspectblog.wordpress.com/2016/01/19/yes-they-can/>. For more on the distinct roles 
of the House and Senate and their relevance for the amending formula, see also: Yasmin Dawood, 
“The Process of Electoral Reform in Canada: Democratic and Constitutional Constraints” (2016) 
presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference. 
37  It is worth noting the Senate has arguably performed very poorly as a body that functions 
to provide regional or provincial representation, but if anything that empirical reality undermines the 
Court’s reasoning in the Senate reference rather than serves to apply it to the context of electoral 
reform vis-à-vis the House. 
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including sections 40 and 41, and arguably by the constitutional preamble, 
which ascribes to Canada “a Constitution similar in Principle to that  
of the United Kingdom”. Attempts to change the electoral system to one 
that is not solely based on geographic electoral districts might constitute 
an amendment that affects provincial interests.38  
One problem with this suggestion is that sections 40 and 41 explicitly 
provide Parliament with the authority to make changes in this area. For 
example, section 40 reads as follows: “Until the Parliament of Canada 
otherwise provides, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick 
shall, for the Purposes of the Election of Members to serve in the House of 
Commons, be divided into Electoral Districts as follows: … .” Importantly, 
these provisions are regarded as spent. The dissenting judgment in the 1965 
case R. v. McKay39 describes section 41 as “an interim provision” that was 
exhausted after Parliament passed legislation to replace then-existing 
provincial laws.40 The majority in McKay, however, approvingly cited the 
1879 case Valin v. Langlois,41 which held that “the Parliament of Canada 
has the exclusive power of legislation over Dominion controverted 
elections. By the lex Parliamentariam as well as by the 41st, 91st, and 92nd 
sections of the British North America Act, this power is as complete as if it 
was specially and by name contained in the enumeration of the federal 
powers of section 91.” Even if altering electoral districts is now thought to 
require constitutional amendment because parts of the relevant statutes are 
deemed part of the Constitution, these provisions, coupled with this 
historical context and jurisprudence, lend much weight to the argument that 
such changes can be accomplished by Parliament alone under section 44. 
III. ELECTORAL REFORM AND THE CHARTER OF  
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
The democratic rights of Canadian citizens are listed in sections 3, 4 
and 5 of the Charter. Sections 4 and 5 mandate that elections be held at 
least every five years,42 and that there be a sitting of Parliament (and each 
                                                                                                                       
38  My thanks to B. Thomas Hall for proposing this argument in e-mail and on Twitter. 
39  [1965] S.C.J. No. 51, [1965] S.C.R. 798 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “McKay”]. 
40  Presumably a similar logic explains why s. 40 is also regarded as spent. My thanks to 
James Sprague for alerting me to this jurisprudence. 
41  [1879] S.C.J. No. 2, 3 S.C.R. 1, at 71 (S.C.C.). 
42  Section 4(2) provides an exception in time of real or apprehended war, invasion or 
insurrection, so long as a continuation of the House of Commons or legislative assembly is not 
opposed by more than one-third of the members. 
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provincial legislature) at least once every 12 months, respectively. As these 
are long-standing and uncontroversial rules, most relevant jurisprudence 
pertaining to democratic rights takes place in relation to section 3, which 
states that “Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of 
members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be 
qualified for membership therein.”  
The courts have dealt with a variety of issues implicating section 3 
since the Charter’s enactment. They have invalidated restrictions that 
prohibit certain categories of people from voting, including judges43 and 
prisoners,44 but have upheld residency requirements.45 The Supreme Court 
has also upheld laws that advance equality of participation in the electoral 
process in challenges to federal third party advertising legislation46 and a 
ban on the dissemination of election results before polls in other parts  
of the country closed.47 The jurisprudence under section 3 has been the 
subject of much commentary, which I do not have room to examine here. 
As Yasmin Dawood writes, the Court’s approach to section 3 reveals “a 
bundle of democratic rights” that combine institutional and individual 
dimensions.48 These various democratic rights have arguably been applied 
inconsistently across cases, making it difficult to derive much predictive 
capacity from the jurisprudence. Nevertheless, in this section I will argue 
that the jurisprudence is sufficiently clear to conclude that, broadly 
speaking, Parliament has wide latitude to implement electoral reform. 
Three cases that are perhaps the most relevant for considering the 
constitutionality of electoral reform involve electoral boundaries,49 
restrictions on benefits for political parties50 and a challenge to the FPTP 
                                                                                                                       
43  Muldoon v. Canada, [1988] F.C.J. No. 1003, [1988] 3 F.C. 628 (F.C.T.D.). 
44  Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 
(S.C.C.). 
45  Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haig”]; Reference re Yukon Election Residency Requirement, [1986] Y.J. No. 14, 
27 D.L.R. (4th) 146 (Y.T.C.A.); Storey v. Zazelenchuk, [1984] S.J. No. 800, 36 Sask. R. 103, 12 
C.R.R. 261 (Sask. C.A.); Arnold v. Attorney-General of Ontario, [1987] O.J. No. 889, 61 O.R. (2d) 
481 (Ont. H.C.J.). 
46  Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 
(S.C.C.). 
47  R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.). 
48  Yasmin Dawood, “Democracy and the Right to Vote: Rethinking Democratic Rights 
under the Charter” (2015) 51(1) Osgoode Hall L.J. 251. 
49  Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 
158 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.)”]. 
50  Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, 2003 
SCC 37 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Figueroa”]. 
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system in Quebec.51 At issue in Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries 
(Sask.) were changes to electoral boundaries in Saskatchewan that 
introduced quotas for urban and rural seats, resulting in significant 
variation in the size and population of the ridings (ridings were permitted 
to vary by up to 25 per cent of a “provincial quotient”, with the two 
northern ridings varying by up to 50 per cent). A 5-3 majority of the 
Supreme Court eschewed a “one person, one vote” rule, finding that the 
right to vote “is not equality of voting power per se, but the right to 
‘effective representation’”. The majority noted that while effective 
representation includes parity of voting power as one of its principles, 
absolute parity is impossible in practice, and that other factors, including 
geography, community history and interests, and minority representation 
“may need to be taken into account to ensure that our legislative 
assemblies effectively represent the diversity of our social mosaic”. In 
this context, the variance in riding sizes did not amount to a violation of 
section 3. Importantly, the Court’s recognition of the legitimacy of 
legislative consideration of other factors would no doubt apply to 
electoral reform as well. 
In Figueroa the Court struck down federal restrictions on benefits  
to political parties that do not nominate 50 candidates to run in an 
election.52 Writing for the majority, Iacobucci J. determined that in 
addition to effective representation, section 3 also encapsulates a right to 
meaningful participation in the electoral process.53 In so doing, Iacobucci J. 
rejected the government’s argument that parties that run fewer than  
50 candidates do not advance the objective of effective representation. 
Instead, he characterized section 3 as “participatory in nature”,54 stating 
further that “the electoral process has an intrinsic value independent of 
its impact upon the actual outcome of elections”.55 Justice Iacobucci 
stated that members and supporters of political parties that put forward 
fewer than 50 candidates do play a meaningful role in the election 
process, something which is not limited to a party’s ability to provide a 
genuine “government option”.56  
                                                                                                                       
51  Daoust v. Quebec (Chief Electoral Officer), [2011] Q.J. No. 12526, 2011 QCCA 1634 
(Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Daoust”]. 
52  The Court was unanimous on the outcome but three justices wrote concurring reasons. 
53  Figueroa, supra, note 50, at para. 25. The concept was first recognized in Haig, supra, 
note 45. 
54  Id., at para. 26. 
55  Id., at para. 29. 
56  Id., at para. 39. 
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A concurring judgment written by LeBel J. agreed with the general 
thrust of Iacobucci J.’s reasons, but disagreed with how meaningful 
participation is defined. Specifically, LeBel J. disagreed with Iacobucci 
J.’s emphasis on the individual aspects of meaningful participation, 
arguing that communitarian features, such as national representation and 
inter-group alliances, were relevant.57 Justice LeBel argued that other 
values relevant to the electoral process, including cohesiveness and 
aggregation, ought to be recognized in the section 3 analysis.58 
Justice LeBel cited the existing FPTP electoral system as “perhaps the 
most significant example” of the constitutional relevance of these 
values.59 He noted that while FPTP creates biases in favour of larger, 
mainstream parties and “distorts” the translation of votes into seats, it 
possesses virtues of representing broad communities of diverse interests 
and creating stable majorities connected to the Canadian tradition of 
responsible government, thereby fostering a strong political centre and 
reducing factionalism.60 Importantly, especially in light of the question of 
the electoral system’s consistency with section 3, LeBel J. wrote: 
It should be emphasized that I do not intend to express any opinion 
about the consistency of our FPTP electoral system with s. 3 of the 
Charter. Any challenge to that system will have to be evaluated on its 
own merits. Nor would I wish to give the impression that I consider 
stability, majority governments or aggregation to be more important 
than fair participation. Nevertheless, within the boundaries set by the 
Constitution, it is the legislature’s prerogative to choose whether to 
enhance these values over other democratic values, or not. Still less 
should I be taken as suggesting that FPTP or any feature of the electoral 
system that favours larger parties is constitutionally mandated. On the 
contrary, I would argue that the government has a fairly wide latitude 
in choosing how to design the electoral system and how to combine the 
various competing values at play.61  
Justice Iacobucci did not agree that it followed that the values 
encapsulated in FPTP are necessarily embedded in the Charter or that 
they ought to be balanced against the individual right to meaningful 
                                                                                                                       
57  Id., at para. 101. 
58  Id., at para. 153. 
59  Id., at para. 154. 
60  Id., at paras. 154-157. Justice LeBel acknowledges the highly contested nature of these 
virtues. 
61  Id., at para. 158 [emphasis in italics is mine]. 
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participation.62 He noted that “the Charter is entirely neutral as to the 
type of electoral system in which the right to vote or to run for office is 
to be exercised. This suggests that the purpose of s. 3 is not to protect the 
values or objectives that might be embedded in our current electoral 
system, but, rather, to protect the right of each citizen to play a meaningful 
role in the electoral process, whatever that process might be.”63 Instead, the 
relevance of those values are, in Iacobucci J.’s view, a matter to be 
addressed in reasonable limits analysis under section 1.64 
Despite the disagreement over whether these competing values should 
be balanced within the definition limits of section 3 or within a section 1 
analysis, there is much to commend LeBel J.’s viewpoint that Parliament 
would have wide latitude over the design of the electoral system. Indeed, 
Iacobucci J.’s analysis would seem to support the same conclusion.  
Although some have suggested that the FPTP system itself may 
infringe section 3 rights,65 others believe that the existing jurisprudence 
would generally tend towards deference to Parliament as it relates to the 
design of the electoral system.66 This was precisely the result in a 2011 
constitutional challenge to the FPTP system in Daoust.67 Drawing on 
Iacobucci J.’s analysis in Figueroa, the Quebec Court of Appeal, 
upholding the lower court judgment, rejected the claimants’ arguments 
that the FPTP system prevented effective representation and meaningful 
participation.68 Noting that no electoral system is perfect, Dufresne J.A. 
concluded that “effective representation is not dependent on the electoral 
system, and the evidence does not justify asserting that the first-past-the-
post system that prevails in Quebec makes the representation of citizens 
ineffective. On the contrary, the expert evidence tends to demonstrate 
that every system has shortcomings. Therefore, it cannot be concluded 
that the principle of effective representation is violated solely as a 
                                                                                                                       
62  Id., at para. 37. 
63  Id. 
64  Id., at para. 31. 
65  Trevor Knight, “Unconstitutional Democracy? A Charter Challenge to Canada’s  
Electoral System” (1999) 57 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1; David Beatty, “Making Democracy Constitutional”, 
Policy Options (July 1, 2001), online: <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/votes-and-seats/making-
democracy-constitutional/>. 
66  Guy Régimbald & Dwight Newman, The Law of the Canadian Constitution (Markham, 
ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2013), at 730; Greg Flynn & Tanya Kuzman, “Meaningful Participation? 
The Judicialization of Electoral Reform in Canada Post-Figueroa v. Canada” (2013) 7(1) Canadian 
Political Science Rev. 37. 
67  Daoust, supra, note 51. 
68  Id. 
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function of the electoral system.”69 For an electoral system to be valid, it 
“must confer on the electorate or assure it of a minimal, albeit significant, 
degree of representation”.70  
While current judicial reasoning relating to democratic rights 
ultimately leads to the conclusion that the FPTP system is compatible 
with section 3, it does not constitutionally mandate that system. Indeed, 
the logic articulated by the Supreme Court in Reference re Prov. Electoral 
Boundaries and Figueroa, and by the Quebec Court of Appeal in Daoust 
would clearly apply to alternative electoral systems. To unreasonably 
infringe democratic rights, changes to the electoral system would have to 
hinder the right to vote by placing substantive or procedural obstacles on 
the ability of individuals or particular classes of people to meaningfully 
participate in elections; depart significantly from the principle of voter 
parity (with variances more stark than permitted under the current system); 
or substantially alter, in a manner that departs from basic principles of 
democratic representation, the individual voter’s relationship with his or 
her elected official(s).  
Barring radical proposals that undermine effective representation or 
meaningful participation  and it is difficult to identify any as it relates 
to the most commonly cited alternatives to FPTP in the Canadian 
context, including preferential balloting, MMP, or single-transferable 
vote (“STV”)  Parliament should be free to implement electoral 
reform. Party-list PR systems are not typically proposed for Canadian 
electoral reform, in part due to the country’s regional diversity. It is 
possible certain forms of PR could have implications for section 3’s right 
“to be qualified for membership” in a legislature, given that a system 
employing party lists would require candidates to run under party 
banners for those seats.71 In a pure list system that included no seats for 
geographically-based ridings, independent candidates would effectively 
be shut out of the electoral process and would likely have a strong 
section 3 claim. But in a hybrid system like MMP, independent candidates 
would be free to run for riding-based seats while only being shut out of the 
seats drawn up by party lists. This latter system might still constitute a 
(marginal) limitation on eligibility, as it would restrict independent 
candidates’ ability to run for office in relation to a specific set of seats. Yet 
given the government’s likely articulation of its objectives in reforming 
                                                                                                                       
69  Id., at para. 57. 
70  Id., at para. 44. 
71  Credit to B. Thomas Hall for articulating this argument. 
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the system  proportionality being at the top of the list, which would be 
designed at least in part to improve vote parity  it is difficult to see 
such a limitation not being upheld as reasonable under section 1.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The authority of Parliament to implement electoral reform is arguably 
cast in doubt by recent jurisprudence pertaining to the amending formula. 
The Court’s elaboration of the scope of the general procedure relative to 
section 44 in the context of amendments affecting the Senate creates 
uncertainty and risks unintended consequences. In this article, I have 
argued why Parliament’s authority to make changes to the electoral 
system is, for the most part, in fact consistent with the constitutional 
architecture concept and an understanding of the role of the House of 
Commons as it relates to provincial interests. This argument is grounded 
in an attempt to approach the issue of constitutional amendment from the 
perspective of this recent jurisprudence and placing it in the context of 
the Court’s own reasoning.  
Nonetheless, the article has also briefly raised normative reasons why 
a requirement for provincial consent under the general procedure would 
be constitutionally inappropriate and undesirable.72 To briefly expand  
on this normative dimension, I will address two key points. First, 
interpreting the role or fundamental nature of the House of Commons in 
a manner that imbues the provinces with a legitimate interest in the way 
in which its members are elected arguably undermines federalism itself. 
This argument may seem, at first blush, counter-intuitive. Despite my 
criticism of the Court’s reasoning in Reference re Senate Reform, that 
decision is properly hailed as supporting the federal character of the 
country.73 Yet, as noted above, the upper chamber expressly provides for 
regional (or provincial) representation as part of its core function. The 
House is meant to provide for popular representation of the national will. 
                                                                                                                       
72  It is worth noting that arguments about the feasibility of electoral reform or the ability of 
Parliament to implement it without provincial consent might correlate to individual’s normative 
opinion about the desirability of electoral reform generally. In the interests of disclosure, while  
I would be happy to see preferential balloting introduced, I would generally prefer to keep the FPTP 
system over any of the other alternatives. Despite this normative view, I believe the government 
enjoys a mandate to enact electoral reform and that Parliament enjoys the authority to implement it 
without provincial consent. 
73  For a good discussion on this point, see Carissima Mathen, “The Federal Principle: 
Constitutional Amendment and Intergovernmental Relations” in Constitutional Amendment in 
Canada, Emmett Macfarlane, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016). 
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Although aspects of the House’s composition relate to regional 
representation  the regional composition of cabinet is influenced by  
the available members of the government caucus in the House, for 
example  electoral reform will not in itself alter existing conventions 
governing those features. This is in stark contrast to the impact proposed 
consultative elections would have on the essential functioning of the 
Senate. 
Second, interpreting section 44 so narrowly as to exclude electoral 
reform from its ambit would only cement the degree to which the 
Canadian Constitution suffers from a paralysis. If provincial interests 
extend so far as to negate Parliament’s authority in this context, it is 
difficult to imagine a role for section 44 at all but for the most superficial 
of changes. Such a reading, in my view, would also be inconsistent with 
the history of constitutional amendment in Canada generally and the 
plain meaning of section 44 specifically. The dangers of constitutional 
stasis are obvious, but worth emphasizing. While core features of a 
constitution should not be subject to the changing whims of ordinary 
majoritarian politics, it should certainly not be so difficult to change that 
its continued relevance and vitality for the functioning of good 
governance stagnates over time. The inability to enact meaningful Senate 
reform, despite the archaic nature of that institution, is a testament to 
this. While clearly a product of both the amending formula itself and the 
politics of constitutional change in Canada, the inability to enact reform 
even in cases of deep and broad consensus is deeply problematic. The 
courts must be cautious about further exacerbating this problem, 
particularly when the amending formula itself embeds features designed 
to provide for flexibility in relation to changes to central institutions. 
A similar normative underpinning substantiates my argument that the 
Charter’s democratic rights do not provide serious impediments to most 
reasonable electoral reform options. As the courts have recognized, no 
electoral system is perfect, and each balances different and competing 
values and objectives. While the jurisprudence surrounding section 3 
evinces an arguably piecemeal, rather than coherent, articulation and 
application of the various democratic rights, the courts have 
appropriately read those rights, including effective representation and 
meaningful participation, as generally permitting a range of structural 
alternatives in different aspects of the law of democracy. As it relates to 
electoral reform, the courts owe due deference to Parliament’s weighing 
of those competing values.  
 
